Exploring the Complexities of
the Ossetian War
Article and photos by Jonathan Alpeyrie.
Throughout the 20th and now the 21st century,
the political situation in the South Caucasus has never been an
easy problem to solve. Russia's interests in the region, contrary
to popular belief, are still strong. The Russians still have military
bases in Abkhazia Georgia, in Armenia, and some troops in Azerbaijan,
while more than 70,000 soldiers have been injected into Chechnya
to tame the rebels, with an extra 50,000 men and 350 tanks on
the northern border of Georgia, and 1,500 men in South Ossetia.
With such forces spread out all over the region, it is pretty
clear that Putin's economic and military ambitions in the Caucasus
are to maintain a forceful foothold. Now, the question is, why?
The answer is two fold. The Russians think they cannot afford
to give independence to anybody who wishes it, as its territorial
integrity depends on it. For instance in Tartarstan, if the more
than 18 million Muslims sitting on Russia's largest oil reserve
in central Russia asked for certain demands, it might create an
independence movement through out the country. Putin and his government
can ill afford such conduct if they want to keep a unified Russia.
The other possible answer is more historical and political. Perhaps
Russia is still a country attached to its more glorious communist
times, when the Soviets controlled more diverse nations and natural
resources than any other country in the world. This nostalgia
can explain the Putin government's tough policies concerning its
neighbors who were once part of the Soviet block.
South Ossetia, truly the Southern extension of North Ossetia,
where the horrible events in Beslan took place, is just one piece
of the puzzle in Russia's military policy overhaul towards the
South Caucasus. This rather small region is populated by no more
than 70,000, of which 30% are Georgian and the rest are Ossetians.
They are trapped between high hills to the East and West and the
impassable Caucasus Mountains in the North separating Russia from
Georgia. Since August, fighting has been on and off the region
creating a potentially explosive situation where Ossetian separatists
and Cossacks mercenaries from the Don River, aided by the Russian
troops and advisers, have been battling Georgian soldiers situated
both inside South Ossetia and outside in Georgia. The military
situation is complicated and riddled with small offensives, firefights,
and sometimes bombardments; civilian and military casualties are
light but continuous.
The hills surrounding the Ossetian Valley are populated by hundreds
of Ossetian and Cossack soldiers supported by heavy artillery
and tanks, all living in trenches overlooking the entire valley
which constitute most of the habitable portion of South Ossetia.
Only one paved road exists in the region on a North/South axis,
from the Southern border with Georgia first passing through the
capital of Ossetia, Tskinvali, then six Georgian villages where
10,000 people live. Of these six villages, Tamaracheni, the most
Southern of the villages, is the most exposed to Ossetian firing
and RPG attacks. These villages are the very sources of the conflict,
as the Ossetians want them back, with the use of force if necessary.
In order to prevent such action, the Georgian government sent
in its best battalion, the113th into the region, with one company
inside Tamaracheni (about 150 men) to defend the Georgians living
in the valley. The unit took positions in the villages, and on
two surrounding hills to keep watch on their enemies. The Georgian
soldiers in the battalion, all trained and equipped by the US
army, are very active. Every day patrols deep inside Ossetian
territory over the hills are organized to retake positions or
to spy on new enemy positions. Snipers are also sent in the surrounding
hills to hunt down Ossetian soldiers or bring back intelligence
to the company's headquarter in Tamaracheni. Their superior training
and equipment make the Georgian battalion in the conflict zone
a most formidable opponent. During the heavy fighting in mid-August,
the Ossetians tried to retake one of the Eastern hills and its
forest which overlooks Tamaracheni. More than 400 on the Ossetian/Cossack
side were killed, while the Georgian lost 16 men and had 125 wounded
but managed to stop their offensive.
Today the overhaul situation in South Ossetia remains explosive.
The 1,500 Russian "peace keepers" were put in place
supposedly to maintain order and peace. However, the reality of
the situation in the region is far from what the Russians want
the international community to know. Officially, no Russian help
or soldiers are aiding the Ossetian cause. They do not supply
them with weapons, training, night vision technology, or even
troop reinforcement in the form of mercenaries fighting for money.
Of course, none of this is true. The Russians have supplied the
Ossetians with tanks, two combat helicopters, and hundreds of
Cossacks mercenaries paid one hundred dollars a day, with extra
pay of 200 dollars if they kill a Georgian, and one thousand if
they blow up a tank. These mercenaries are known for their brutality
and lack of self-conduct on civilian turf.
It is hard to say what the future holds for the people and soldiers
living inside the South Ossetian region. However, it is safe to
say that the situation will remain dangerous at least until the
end of the year, as none of the opposing parties are ready to
concede any terrain. The Russians are also far from sponsoring
peace, and wish to see an independent Ossetian state, which could
be attached to Russia once again. Heavy propaganda work has influenced
the Ossetians over the past ten years in such a way that now most
would rather be part of a nation which certainly does not care
for them, than a small nation with western aspiration lead by
a young and energetic Georgian president like Mikhail Saakashvili.
For years the Russians have told the freedom fighters that Georgia
was responsible for their demise and economic struggles, while
giving free electricity and heat to the Ossetians to show Russia's
good intentions. Of course the reality of Russia's politics is
far from what the Ossetians might think. Russian leaders working
for Putin dream to see a strong Russia in the South Caucasus.
The Ossetians are wrong to seek such separation. The Georgian
government is willing to concede some political independence as
it did in Ajaria in March 2004, while keeping the territorial
integrity of the country. To follow Georgia and its will to change
into a more modern and western society would mean a more profitable
and stable situation for Ossetia in the long run. The answer for
Georgia and the separatist regions can be found in a system born
out of federalism, where all ethnic groups would have a say in
Georgia's future while keeping its cultural and ethnic particularities.
However, such utopia will not convince most Ossetians or Abkhazians
who wish to remain independent or part of Russia. The struggle
for Ossetia is far from over and future clashes and deaths among
civilians as well as military are likely to remain until one side
has lost the war, or if Russia decides to do the right thing by
telling the Ossetians to lay down their arms and find a peaceful
solution.
Webmaster's note:
It is a pleasure to highlight the work of Jonathan Alpeyrie, a
renown photojournalist with a great deal of experience in emerging
markets. World Investment News therefore supports his work, even
if the opinion of this report does not necessarily reflect the
opinion of its management.