LIBERIA
too many opportunities, too few tappers

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Mr. Brian O'Neil, Chargé d'Affaires

OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN LIBERIA

Interview with:

Mr. Brian O'Neill
Chargé d'Affaires
From an economic and social perspective, how significantly has Liberia evolved since 1997?

I think you have to see Liberia not over the past three years but really over the past ten to twenty years. Many people describe the origin of the current crisis back to the eighties, back to the "coup d'Etat" which brought Master Sergeant Doe to power. The EU concentrated its efforts on putting Liberia back together as a unitary State; this would lead to democratic elections, to a government, reconstruction and reconciliation. That happened in 1997. Before the elections there was a disarmament mobilisation programme, which was crucial. All the factions agreed in 1996 to that process and a lot of resources were put into insuring that men would give up the guns. In terms of social and economic activities, we sponsored many activities, which were job creation. We had a programme, which was called " jobs for guns". Fighters would give up the guns and in exchange will be given a job. In most cases this was a manual one; for instance, clearing plantations, opening roads and so on. The goal was that in working they would develop skills. Some of the people had been rubber tappers. Rubber tapping became lucrative so by providing them with a cup and a knife, they could go back to their former activity and make a good living out of it. Others became farmers; others were given technical skills training to become mechanics for instance. The idea was to get as many as these back into a civilian activity as soon as possible. That would reassure the population. Groups of ex-combatants would be organised into work gangs. The team would go to a plantation and say: " we will provide you with free labour to clear your plantation and in exchange you will try to employ afterwards some of these ex-combatants as workers". The success rate was one in three. These ex-combatants would help the farmer clear his land. He had the chance of working with them and after one to two months go back to farming, and keep some of the workers. At one point, the EU was sponsoring around 8000 ex-combatants in these programmes. Out of the eight thousand, the team managed to put about 4000 into permanent long- term employment. So, in many ways it was a successful programme. You could not have peace, stability and economic development so long as you had men with guns in the field. There are two aspects: one is fear, lack of confidence among the rural population, fear of being raided. The farmers did not want to plant the fields because when the harvests came, the fighters would come and steal the harvests. The other aspect was a psychological approach; rural communities had suffered deeply from the seven years civil war. By seeing the same men that had caused terror coming back with no guns in their hands but with shovels and hoes instead to assist the communities meant that they felt safe again. This country has suffered enormously from mass population movement, one third of the population fled into neighbouring countries. One third of the population was internally displaced, of which most came to Monrovia or to Buchanan. The population of Monrovia doubled in two years. People should go back into their region of origin. They have to believe they can stay there. If they have been chased from their home by armed bands, and seen their neighbours killed, then naturally, they were reluctant to go back unless there was some long-term stability and security. People have to see it for themselves, experience it, so a lot of work was a kind of confidence building type. It was a long-term approach. Liberia was functioning without basic services. These normal community services from which every community should benefit, whether educational or infrastructure ones, no longer existed because delivery mechanisms had been destroyed by the war.

As a foreigner, coming to a country and starting to assist the population who have suffered from a seven years civil war is not an easy task…

Credibility is important. There are three things that count: performance, performance, performance. The EU delivered when it said it would. No false promises were made. The second element is neutrality. The EU remained strictly neutral during the course of the civil war. Victims of the war on all sides were helped in a fair and equal manner. We did not get associated with one side or the other.

Did you maintain a representation during the civil war?

In 1990, when the war started our offices were closed and only reopened in 1994. This was when we believed we could restart our activities. On the meantime, we had lost everything. Our offices had been looted. The EU office today is in what used to be the Italian Embassy. There were five European Embassies in Monrovia before the war. The principle framework for EU assistance to Liberia is the Lome Convention. Now replaced by the Cotonou Agreement, the EU sought a way of operating in a country that was in crisis. 100 million USD had been spent between 1990 and 1994 in food aid, aid to refugees and humanitarian aid. That was exactly ten times more than what we had been spending on development assistance the previous three years. As an institution dedicated to long-term development activities, the imbalance between short-term relief and the real needs of the country for long-term economic development was not sustainable. A way to fund more productive work had to be found. A controversial decision in 1995 was to suspend the food aid programme to Liberia. The reasons for this were to break the dependency syndrome on external aid. In a fertile country long-term food aid doesn't make sense. When we stopped in farms and asked: "why don't you grow food?" Farmers would answer there was no point as an aid agency down the road was giving it away free. The market was flooded with food aid. This was damaging the local economy. But in parallel to cutting the food aid, a food security programme was put in place. By reducing the volume of food aid, a local market potential was created. Aid agencies were encouraged to buy food locally and distribute it instead of importing it. The commodity in the food aid basket was also changed, from rice to bulgur wheat. Liberians do not like bulgur; they prefer rice, therefore seeds and tools were provided to grow rice. Another issue was food aid in food for work programmes. It was necessary to get back to a cash economy instead rather than to a commodity distribution programme. A simple statistic: in 1993, the food aid imports were about 150.000 T. In 1999 140.000 T of rice was grown in Liberia. Liberia needs to become more self-sufficient.

To what extent would you say this is the most important challenge Liberia is facing at this stage?

The challenge is to make Liberia self sufficient in food; and then look for comparative advantages in agriculture; and concentrate on that. Rubber is an example.

A number of surrounding economies are also rubber producers…

Yes, but Liberia has been a traditional producer, and there are a lot of skilled workers available. I believe they can be very competitive with neighbouring countries. In rural areas, there are also many other commodities such as palm oil for instance, or cassava. Commodities that are cash crops. There is also a certain amount of coffee and cocoa, although producers here would have difficulties competing with countries like Cote d'Ivoire or Ghana. However, the main wealth of Liberia lies in its natural resources, and more particularly in underground ones. The most obvious one is iron ore. Deposits on the Northern border with Guinea are among the richest in this part of Africa. In Liberia the main iron ore deposits are in two sites, the Bong iron ore in Central West of the country and the Yekapa iron ore, which is north in the Mount Nimba. The Bong iron ore is not of high quality - less than 33%- and the war damage done to the mine make it likely that the mine will never come on stream again. The investment required is too high when looking at the possible return. On the other hand, the Yekapa mine is only thirty kilometres from Mount Nimba, which is a mount of iron ore of very high quality. Before the war the Guinean and Liberian authorities had created a joint venture, which was supposed to be the project that would attract commercial operators. The iron ore would be mined in Guinea and shipped out through Liberia. The existing rail link which goes from the Port of Buchanan to Yekapa, and which was used to evacuate the iron ore, could be rehabilitated; a link could be built from Yekapa to Mount Guinea. If there is peace and stability over the long term in Liberia, major commercial investments can be expected.
Your comments raise the question of political stability in the sub-region, not only in Guinea, but also in Sierra Leone. What are your expectations in terms of reaching peace stability over the long term? Moreover, to what extent your experience in Liberia could be applied to some other countries?

Every crisis is different and every country is unique. What works in one country will not necessarily work in another. Having said that, a lot of lessons have been learnt. Experience in Liberia and in other countries should help in Sierra Leone to achieve disarmament and demobilisation. Relations between Liberia and its three main neighbours - Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ivory Coast - are sometimes tense. The main regional forum, which is ECOWAS, has been very successful at maintaining a dialogue between the different countries. This is a good example of conflict prevention at work. Of course, more needs to be done and the current concerns about the involvement of Liberians in some way in the Sierra Leone crisis is a concern and has to be dealt with. There is evidence that a trade in arms and diamonds is happening. To what extent sanctions need to be applied? Not enough efforts have been developed so far in Monrovia to stop whatever trade is going on. This situation is damaging Liberia's image abroad.

I would like to go back to the EU activities in Liberia, could you elaborate on your other programmes and particularly in the health sector?

One of our main programmes is in the health sector. The EU most likely represents 60% of all the aid into the health sector. Our main work is in the establishment and functioning of what is called the National Drug Service. Through European NGOs, the delivery of basic health services at the community is supported. In most of Liberia's 14 Counties, there is what is called a County Health Team. That County Health Team, which used to be part of the Ministry of Health is now isolated as the Ministry of Health has very few financial resources. A number of partnerships have been put in place between international NGOs, specialists in the health sector, and local County Health Teams to provide basic health services to the population; these include vaccination programmes. Currently, there are 17 different NGOs working in this area. Our total investment per annum in the health sector is about 9 million USD.

Where else do you allocate your resources?

Food Security operations which cover rice production and animal husbandry for instance represent about 7 million USD a year. There is also a significant water sanitation programme because without water there is no life. Most people have now access to clean water. It doesn't necessarily come out of a tap, but they have access to clean water. A recent survey that we did in Monrovia shows that 70% of the population said to have access to clean water. In the early days, water was seen as a commodity which was provided free of charge. However, water was provided not only to the populations but also to the brewery, to Coca-Cola, as well as to embassies. This situation was difficult to justify. Those who could afford to pay should pay. So in 1997, a revenue management programme determining a commercial tariff for water was agreed. Very quickly this was generating enough revenue to cover most of the expenditures of the programme in local currency. A project, which had been 100% subsidised by international taxpayers was becoming income generating. This process showed to Liberians that water was a commodity, and not a free right. People were receiving pure and clean water, which had been treated and that process had a cost. This was all done through local institutions thus building capacity skills.

How would you explain the lack of electricity supply?

There are only two capitals in Africa, which don't have electricity. One is Monrovia and the other is Mogadiscio. The reason being that the market here is not sufficiently developed to justify the level of investment that would be required to generate a commodity. Electricity can only be produced if there is a market that will somehow pay for it. If it has to be 100% subsidised by the international community taxpayer it will not happen. You can't live without water, but you can live without electricity. It is not seen as a survival issue, but it is important for the future of this country. Electricity is needed here. A figure that is not very well known, is that Liberian Electricity Corporation, LEC, which has no money, is owed 80 million USD, by other parastatals and government, for electricity produced between 1981 and 1989, which was never paid for. That is the problem faced here, distributing commodities and not receiving revenues.

As far as privatisation is concerned, would institutions such as LEC be concerned?

Investors have to look at the long-term. They should also not be alone in investing. There are many institutions that may get involved in a practical way, such as the World Bank. Privatisation will happen. Privatisation of public utilities is the future for Liberia, as it has been the future for many other countries. It has to be done in a transparent way. There are companies in Europe, in the States, in Asia who would be willing to come in and get involved. They would need to be experts in their field and have an experience of situations like Liberia. It is not just the electricity sector, there are about five utilities that need to be studied for privatisation: electricity is one, water and sewage, telecommunications, the National Port Authority and the airports. The future for these utilities is in the private sector. We will do what we can to favour an enabling environment for the private sector. The President has committed himself on many occasions to the private sector, on providing a legal framework, which would encourage the private sector. But that is still not there. Institutions like the World Bank could help the government to achieve this clear enabling environment by providing assistance, advice and guidance as to how it could be done.

Can we expect a better recognition of Liberia abroad?

Liberia is recognized abroad. It is the oldest Republic in Africa. It is a member of virtually all international institutions. You probably refer to the image of Liberia abroad, which is not what it should be because of the concerns regarding Liberia's alleged involvement in what is happening in neighbouring countries. Liberia is also paying the price for a very savage civil war; and people's memories are still there of a country with child soldiers, and quite horrible human rights atrocities. And that is still fresh; it is not forgotten.

As I was asking earlier, how significantly has Liberia evolved, in the past three years?

I think you have to put it into perspective. No matter what people say about conditions today, I keep saying that it was much worse 3 years ago, or 5 years or 7 years ago. Everything is relative. Liberia is definitely moving forward, in the sense of achieving a certain level of peace and stability. It is far from where it should be, but since 1997 there has been some major improvements although there still are some major issues that must be constantly monitored. In general, Liberia is moving towards peace and stability; compared with what it was in 1997, and in 1990 when it was in total anarchy and chaos. On the other hand, there are many things that could have been done to open up the economy or encourage Liberians to get involved in the economy. But then, in some way they are lucky compared to countries like Angola or Sudan who lost a whole generation, who have never experienced peace. Liberia suffered for 7 years only. Some parts of Africa do still not know peace. Liberians have an opportunity to erect from the ashes a new Liberia, which is a fair Liberia where all Liberians have access to basic services. One of the causes of the civil war was inequality in access to basic services and the distribution of wealth before 1990 and before 1980. In this country, during the late 1980s, there were more PhDs per capita than in any other country in Sub Saharan Africa, yet at the same time, this country had one of the highest adult illiteracy rates in Africa. You had the two extremes. It was the same in the Health sector. Liberia has to make sure that the roots of that conflict don't grow back.

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© World INvestment NEws, 2001.
This is the electronic edition of the special country report on Liberia published in Far Eastern Economic Review.
June 21st, 2001 Issue.
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